Judge Throws Out Title VI Suit Against Haverford College Aimed at Silencing Criticism of Israel

[A] litany of complaints related in a general way to the same subject—in this instance the serious problem of antisemitism—is not the same thing as a legally cognizable complaint pled in accordance with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure...

Plaintiffs Jews at Haverford, Alumni Ally Landau, and two anonymous students ... allege that over the past year, Haverford College ... has become a bastion of antisemitism that is tolerated and at times perpetuated by the College. Plaintiffs contend that they have been personally affected by the eruption of disorder on campus. Specifically, they state that they have lost friends, faced harassment, been forced to change their routines, and missed out on seminal Haverford experiences because of escalated antisemitism. They assert that antisemitism at Haverford has fostered a hostile educational environment in violation of Title VI, and that Haverford has breached certain contractual obligations by failing to deal with campus unrest.

At this stage, a court would typically review the relevant facts. I cannot cogently do so here due to the sprawling and disorganized character of Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, which appears to detail every frustration and disagreement of Jewish students and faculty that has occurred at Haverford over the last year. It spills pages of ink on lengthy frolics about events on other college campuses and about ideological debates. Rather than isolating instances of harassment and logically relating them to the elements of a hostile environment claim, Plaintiffs set forth a running list of grievances that reads more as an opinion editorial than it does a legal complaint.

Some of the instances alleged are concerning, and if pled properly, could perhaps support a cognizable legal claim under Title VI. Yet, the Complaint is diluted by instances that no reasonable person could construe as intentional discrimination. For example, Plaintiffs contend that Haverford did not announce the month of May as "American Jewish History Month," and instead only celebrated "Asian American/Pacific Islander Month." Or, Plaintiffs complain that some graduating students at the Spring 2024 commencement donned attire that signified their support for Palestinians—a classic example of protected First Amendment expression. Elsewhere, Plaintiffs include comments made by a professor who does not even attend Haverford. As a result of Plaintiffs' scattered pleading, any serious allegations of actionable discrimination are buried as needles within a haystack of distraction.

Plaintiffs also dedicate a full eight pages of their Complaint to their effort to link Judaism to Zionism, while simultaneously insisting that they are not asking the Court to resolve any religious issues. Plaintiffs' equivocation is disingenuous, but likely strategic, seeking to blur the line between Zionism as a political philosophy and Zionism as a component of Jewish identity, and in the process implicitly sweep any and all criticism of Israel into the basket of antisemitism. {Haverford's briefing also suffers from a lack of nuance in failing to distinguish different types of Zionism or anti-Zionism, because in current usage "Zionism" can hold many different meanings. This serves Defendant's strategic purpose of deeming Zionism strictly a political philosophy, implicitly denying it can, depending on context, constitute an element of Jewish identity.} As a threshold matter, as I have done previously {Tannous v. Cabrini Univ. (E.D. Pa. 2023) (upholding termination of professor by university concerned by tone and content of social media posts about Israel)}, I reject Plaintiffs' embedded proposition that any anti-Israel speech is intrinsically antisemitic, because reasonable people acting in good faith can challenge decisions of the Israeli government without harboring antisemitic views. [Emphasis added]